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Received: 9 January 2020 / Accepted: 3 May 2021
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2021
Abstract
This paper examines whether productivity news shocks were among the drivers of the
Great Recession. To do this, the Smets and Wouters (Am Econ Rev 97(3):586–606,
2007. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.3.586) model is extended by a generalized pref-
erence specification which allows for scaling wealth effects on the labor supply. The
resulting model is estimated using Bayesian methods which draw upon the US data
from the period 1965Q2 to 2014Q3. There are four main results: (i) Estimation of the
model is inconclusive regarding the degree of wealth elasticity of the labor supply. As
a result, two complementary versions of the model prevail, each of which has differing
implications for the transmission and the quantitative importance of exogenous shocks.
(ii)When the degree of wealth elasticity of the labor supply is low, news shocks replace
risk premium shocks, suggesting that news shocks are one possible reason for fluctua-
tions in US business cycles. (iii) When the Great Recession period is analyzed through
the lenses of the two complementary versions of the model, two explanations emerge
as potential reasons behind the deepening of the crisis: worsening credit conditions
as well as the collapse of over-optimistic expectations regarding future productivity.
(iv) For both model specifications, general developments in productivity are estimated
to be positive. Therefore, productivity slowdown is not considered to be among the
reasons for the emergence or persistence of the Great Recession.









The Great Recession was the most severe and extended recession ever experienced in
the post-war USA. Since this crisis occurred, economists have been trying to disentan-
gle the real or financial shocks that may have triggered the recession as well as trying
to quantify the contribution of those shocks in relation to the collapse of economic
activity. In the literature, the consensus is that the recession originated in the financial
sector. However, the origin and relative importance of alternative disturbances, which
amplified the crisis, are still open to debate. In this literature, there has been a recent
discussion revolving around the fact that productivity slowdown may have been either
a cause or a consequence of the Great Recession. Gust et al. (2017) and Christiano
et al. (2015) claim that low productivity growth was among the origins of the crisis. On
the contrary, Lindé et al. (2016) show that productivity shocks were positive during
the recession and weak productivity growth was not a key contributing factor to the
crisis. However, this debate misses an important aspect regarding productivity shocks.
In addition to current productivity developments, as has recently been shown in the
literature, news about future productivity was seen to be an important driver of busi-
ness cycles (Beaudry and Portier 2006; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2012; Fujiwara et al.
2011). In this paper, I address this gap by formally estimating a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model extended with productivity news shocks. I aim to
contribute to this strand of research in two ways: (i) by estimating the productivity
process before and during the recession and (ii) by investigating whether expectation-
driven waves of optimism and pessimism, regarding future productivity, contributed
to the emergence and the deepening of the crisis.
As is suggested by Barro and King (1984) and Cochrane (1994), and more recently
by Beaudry and Portier (2007), it is not easy to accommodate news shocks in the stan-
dard neoclassical growth model or in many of its variants. The transmission of news
shocks in a standard real business cycle model is as follows: Agents expecting higher
future productivity feelwealthier, so they increase their consumption and leisure. Since
the output level is determined by labor supply and predetermined capital, this decline
in the labor supply leads to a fall in output and investment. That is, the good news about
future productivitymove hours and consumption in opposite directions, thus leading to
a recession. As this narrative shows, the capacity of a model to generate news-driven
business cycles depends on its labor market structure. Nebioglu (2017) shows that
to account for news shocks, the labor market structure of the standard neoclassical
growth model can be modified. In particular, internal habit formation in consumption,
preferences with low wealth elasticity of labor supply, and labor adjustment costs can
be used to modify the labor supply schedule, whereas investment adjustment costs,
variable capacity utilization, andwage and price rigidities can be used to alter the labor
demand schedule. In the literature, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) use a generalized
utility function which allows for varying degrees of wealth elasticity of the labor sup-
ply, variable capital utilization costs and investment adjustment costs, Christiano et al.
(2008) assume habit formation in consumption, investment adjustment costs as well
123
Great Recession and news shocks: evidence based on an…
as both wage and price rigidities, and Kobayashi and Nutahara (2010) assume price
rigidity and investment adjustment costs to generate news-driven business cycles.1
In this paper, I use the model developed by Smets andWouters (2007) as the bench-
mark, since it features standard real and nominal frictions proposed in the news shock
literature and has proven to be successful in accounting for unanticipated shocks. Fur-
thermore, it fits the US data well. In addition, to facilitate the operation of news shocks,
I extend this model by using a modified version of the generalized preference structure
offered by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) preferences
nest (King et al. 1988) and (Greenwood et al. 1988) preferences as extreme cases and
allow for scalingwealth effects on the labor supply. King et al. (1988) preferences refer
to the standard neoclassical preference structure with strong wealth effects on labor
supply, as in the original (Smets and Wouters 2007) formulation, while (Greenwood
et al. 1988) preferences show that the magnitude of wealth effects on the labor supply
is zero. I use the generalized preference structure as the empirical evidence based on
estimated DSGE models regarding the magnitude of wealth effects on labor supply is
limited and mixed. Within news shock literature, using (Jaimovich and Rebelo 2009)
preferences and the RBC framework, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) estimate the
parameter governing the wealth effect on the labor supply as close to zero. On the
contrary, Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) estimate a relatively important wealth effect on
the labor supply using a New Keynesian model. On the other hand, Galí et al. (2011)
show that in a standard DSGE model, adding unemployment to the set of observable
variables leads to a dramatic change in the estimate of this parameter.
This paper also makes a methodological contribution to the DSGE literature by
offering a different specification for news shock. Instead of modeling news shock as
an innovation to productivity level that hit the economy at a future date, this paper
specifies news shock as a current innovation to the economy’s growth potential. Similar
to the news shocks literature, this framework aims to identify the expected increase in
future productivity as a source of aggregate fluctuations. A positive innovation in the
growth rate ofTFPmeans a gradual increase in the level of productivity; hence, it can be
used to model optimistic expectations about future productivity levels, i.e., following
this shock, agents observing the increase in productivity expect it will continue to
increase in the future. Modeling news shocks in this fashion is consistent with the
original formulation of Beaudry and Portier (2006) and with the findings of Barsky
et al. (2014). Both studies show that news shocks have the character of anticipated
growth shocks. In particular, they show that productivity displays a smooth increase
over a number of quarters following a news shock.
In this paper, Bayesian methodology is employed for estimations along with quar-
terlyUS data over the period 1965Q2–2014Q3 for seven keymacroeconomic variables
which are the log difference of real GDP; real consumption; real investment; real
wages; log hours worked; the log difference of the GDP deflator; and the federal funds
rate. Throughout the paper, I discuss the results from three different estimations. First,
I estimate the (Smets andWouters 2007)model extended by the generalized preference
structure offered by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). The results from this estimation
1 Interested reader can refer to Beaudry and Portier (2014) for an extensive review of the empirical and
theoretical literature about news shocks.
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show that with different starting values, optimization of the posterior density delivers
two extreme values for the parameter that governs the wealth elasticity of the labor
supply, implying standard (King et al. 1988) preferences at one extreme and (Green-
wood et al. 1988) preferences at the other. In addition, two complementary versions
of the model prevail with different implications for transmission mechanisms and the
quantitative importance of exogenous shocks. Considering the mixed empirical evi-
dence in the literature regarding the magnitude of wealth elasticity parameters, two
additional estimations are made by fixing this parameter to the extreme values prior to
estimation. Hereafter, the model with King et al. (1988) preferences will be referred
to as the KPR model and the model with Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences will be
referred to as the GHH model. For both the KPR and GHH models, the Metropolis–
Hastings algorithm is used to estimate the posterior distribution of the parameters and
the shock processes.
All in all, the results from these estimation exercises are fourfold: (i) For the KPR
model, parameter estimates are very similar to Smets andWouters (2007) and produc-
tivity news shocks are not chosen by the data; (ii) for theGHHmodel, the risk premium
shock is replaced by the productivity news shock, and the dynamics and the quantitative
implications of the model are quite different from Smets and Wouters (2007) model;
(iii) although the two models have different explanations for the business cycles, they
interpret the crisis period rather similarly. For both models, investment-specific tech-
nology shocks and monetary policy shocks are the main causes of the recession, while
productivity shocks contribute positively to the output growth over most of the crisis
period; and (iv) two models interpret the most acute phase of the crisis differently
whereby there was a substantial drop in output during the quarter after the fall of
Lehman Brothers. The KPR model attributes most of the role to risk premium shocks
while the GHHmodel points to the collapse of over-optimistic expectations (followed
by a negative news shock) as the main cause. Therefore, in line with the results of
Lindé et al. (2016), I find that the productivity slowdown itself is not among the causes
of the Great Recession, as it had already started to decline years before the recession.
I do, however, find that agents did not recognize this decline in time and the collapse
of over-optimistic expectations following the fall of Lehman Brothers contributed to
the deepening of the recession.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Sect. 2 presents the model economy while
Sect. 3 presents the loglinearized model. Section 4 explains the data and econometric
methodology. Section 5 discusses the estimation results. Section 6 presents forecast
error variance decompositions and Sect. 7 analyzes the causes the Great Recession
with the help of themodels considered in this paper. Concluding remarks are presented
in Sect. 8.
2 Themodel
This section outlines my model of the US business cycles. It is a medium-scale DSGE
model in the spirit of Smets and Wouters (2007) (SW henceforth) with several real
and nominal frictions. The economy is populated by six agents: households; labor
unions; labor packers; final good producers; intermediate good producers; and the
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government. In the following subsections, I give a detailed description of the model
economy.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by τ ∈ (0, 1). Each household τ chooses
consumption (Cτt ), hoursworked (L
τ
t ), bondholdings (B
τ
t ), investment (I
τ
t ) and capital
utilization (zτt ). I adopt the preference structure suggested by Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2009) (JR, henceforth) which nests two special cases, which I describe later. I modify
this preference structure to include external habit formation in consumption, therefore,
utility depends positively on consumption Cτt relative to the aggregate consumption
of the previous period, Ct−1 and negatively on the labor supply, Lτt .2












1 − σ , (1)
where Xt is a geometric average of current and past habit-adjusted consumption levels




X1−ωt−1 . β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the subjective discount
factor,h ∈ [0, 1)governs thedegreeof external habit formation,σ > 0 is the coefficient
of relative risk aversion, and θ >1 determines the elasticity of labor supply in the
special case ω = 0. The parameter ω ∈ [0, 1] governs the wealth elasticity of labor
supply. When ω = 0, there are no wealth effects on labor supply as in Greenwood
et al. (1988) and with ω = 1 the preference structure boils down to standard (King
et al. 1988) preferences with strong wealth effects on labor supply. For intermediate
values of ω, there are no wealth effects on the labor supply in the short run, however,
they eventually start to build up as time passes. The magnitude of ω determines the
horizon in which wealth effects start to kick in.
The budget constraint expressed in real terms is











Lτt + rkt zτt K τt−1 + Divt − Tt , (2)
and the capital accumulation equation is:












Lτt , return on the real cap-




t−1 and dividend payments, Divt , from labor unions. Tt is lump
2 In their sensitivity analysis, SW show that reducing habit formation in consumption is quite costly in terms
of likelihood, therefore JR preferences are modified to include external habit formation in consumption to
keep the preference structure similar to SW.
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sum tax paid to the government. The capital income depends not only on the capital
accumulated last period but also on its utilization rate, zτt .
The function S(.) introduces investment adjustment costs of the form proposed by
Christiano et al. (2005) with S(γ ) = S′(γ ) = 0, S′′(.) > 0. ε It is the shock to the price
of investment relative to consumption goods and assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
log(ε It ) = (1 − ρI ) log(ε I ) + ρI log(ε It−1) + ηIt where ηIt is IID-Normal investment
specific technology shock.
Households own the capital stock and decide how much capital to rent to inter-
mediate good producers at a given rate, rkt . They can increase their supply of capital
services either by investing in additional capital, It or by increasing the utilization rate
of already installed capital, zt . Increasing the intensity of capital accumulation entails
a cost in the form of a faster depreciation as in Greenwood et al. (1988). Ψ (zt ) is the
depreciation function that is convex in utilization with Ψ ′(zt ) > 0 , Ψ ′′(zt ) ≥ 0. The
depreciation is constant and equals to Ψ in steady state.
Finally, households hold their financial wealth in the form of bonds, Bt . Bonds are
one period securities with price bt . εbt is an exogenous premium in the return to bonds,
which accounts for the inefficiencies in the financial sector leading to some premium
on the deposit rate versus the risk-free rate set by the central bank, or a risk premium
that households require to hold the one period bond and it is assumed to follow AR(1)
process: log(εbt ) = (1 − ρb) log(εb) + ρb log(εbt−1) + ηbt where ηbt is an IID-Normal
risk premium shock.
In equilibrium, households will make the same choices for consumption, hours
worked, bonds, investment, and capital utilization. Therefore, for the rest of this sec-
tion, I will drop τ index for those variables.










where Rt is the gross nominal return on bonds. (Rt = 1+it = 1/bt ) and λt is marginal
utility of consumption which is given by:
λt =
(
Ct − hCt−1 − ψLθt Xt
)−σ (
1 − ωψLθt (Ct − hCt−1)ω−1 X1−ωt
)
. (5)
Households supply their homogeneous labor in a competitive market. First-order
conditions regarding leisure/consumption trade-off give the following labor supply







1 − ωψLθt (Ct − hCt−1)ω−1 X1−ωt
. (6)
wht is the real wage desired by the households and reflects the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between leisure and consumption. Note that when ω = 0, the labor supply
decision depends only on real wages, in this extreme case, there is no wealth effect on
the labor supply.
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The first-order conditions for capital, investment and utilization result in the fol-






rkt+1zτt+1 + Qt+1 (1 − δ(zt+1))
}]
, (7)





























rkt = QtΨ ′(zt ). (9)
Qt is Tobin’s Q and is defined as Qt=μt/λt where μt and λt are Lagrange multi-
pliers associated with the capital accumulation equation and the budget constraint,
respectively.
According to Eq. (7), the value of installed capital depends on the expected future
value of capital taking into account the depreciation rate and the expected future return
to capital.
Equation (8) is the investment Euler equation and determines the dynamics of
investment as a function of the real value of the capital and the investment adjustment
costs.
The first-order condition for the utilization rate given by Equation (9) equates the
cost of higher capital utilization with the rental price of capital services. The cost
function Ψ ′(.) is multiplied by Qt to convert it to a unit for consumption goods. An
increase in the rental rate provides an incentive to increase utilization up to the point
where extra benefit equals extra cost, as long as Qt does notmove in the same direction.
2.2 Firms
The country produces a single homogeneous final good and a continuum of interme-
diate goods. The final good is traded in a perfectly competitive market and is used by
households for consumption and investment. There is monopolistic competition in the
intermediate goods sector, and each household is a producer of a specialized interme-
diate good. The agents in the labor market are the intermediate labor union and labor
packers. The intermediate labor union rents homogeneous labor from households and
differentiates and sells it to labor packers. Labor packers combine differentiated labor
and sell it to intermediate good producers as a homogeneous labor input. Wages for
differentiated labor and prices for differentiated goods are adjusted following (Calvo
1983) model and wages and prices that are not re-optimized are partially indexed to
past inflation rates.
2.2.1 Labor market
Households supply their homogeneous labor, Lt to an intermediate labor union which
then differentiates the labor services as L jt where j ∈ [0, 1] and resells them to labor
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packers. The intermediate unionhasmarket power in its negotiationswith labor packers
and sets wages following the (Calvo 1983) model. In turn, labor packers package labor
composite Lt and sell it to intermediate good producingfirms in a perfectly competitive
environment.




















λw,t is a stochastic parameter that determines the time varying wage markup in the
labor market and it is assumed to follow an ARMA(1,1) process: log λw,t = (1 −
ρw) log λw + ρw log λw,t−1 + θwεwt−1 + εwt where εwt is IID-Normal wage mark-up
shock.









wage cost of the intermediate good producers.
The real wage desired by the households, wht , reflects the marginal rate of substi-
tution between leisure and consumption. The labor union takes this marginal rate of
substitution as the cost of labor services in negotiationswith labor packers. Themarkup
over the marginal disutility is distributed to households as dividends. The union has
market power in its negotiations with labor packers. It can choose the wage rate for
differentiated labor,W jt subject to the labor demand given by Equation (11). However,
due to wage-setting à la (Calvo 1983), it can adjust the wages with a probability of
1-ξw in each period. In addition, wages which cannot be adjusted are changed at the
deterministic growth rate γ and the weighted average of the steady state inflation and
the inflation of the last period. Therefore, the union sets wages considering that they
may not be adjusted for a long period and chooses W̃ jt for each j ∈ [0, 1] to maximize
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and









for s = 1, 2, . . . ,∞.

























1−γw∗ for s = 1, 2, . . . ,∞.
















2.2.2 Final good producers
The final good Yt is a composite made of a continuum of intermediate goods Y it as
in Kimball (1995). The final good producers buy intermediate goods on the market,
package the final good Yt , and resell it to consumers, investors, and the government
in a perfectly competitive market.
The final good producers choose Yt and Y
j


















where Pt and Pit are the price of the final and intermediate goods, respectively, and G
is a strictly concave and increasing function defined by G(1) = 1. λp,t is the markup
disturbance assumed to follow an ARMA(1,1) process : log λp,t = (1− ρp) log λp +
ρp log λp,t−1 + θpε pt−1 + ε pt where ε pt is IID-Normal price mark-up shock.
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Here, λp,t ’s argument is left out when considering the optimization problem, as
it is exogenous. μpt stands for Lagrange multiplier, which is constant for all i . As
suggested in Kimball (1995), Equation (14) allows one to generate any desired shape
of demand curve facing the individual firm.























The assumptions on G(.) imply that the demand for input Y it is decreasing in its
relative price and the elasticity of demand is an increasing function of the relative
price.
2.2.3 Intermediate good producers
Intermediate good producer i ∈ [0, 1] uses the following technology:
Y it = εat (zt Kt−1)α
(
γ t Lt
)1−α − γ tεat Φ. (15)
The capital that is used in production is determined by the capital accumulated
during the previous period (Kt−1) aswell as the utilization rate chosenby the household
(zt ). γ represents the labor augmenting deterministic growth rate in the economy, Φ
represents the fixed costs in production, α represents the elasticity of output with
respect to capital. εat is the total factor productivity which is assumed to follow an
AR(1) process: log εat = (1 − ρa) log εa + ρa log εat−1 + log εgat + ηat . Here, ηat
is IID-Normal neutral productivity shock and εgat is the stochastic growth rate of
TFP which is assumed to follow an AR(1) process: log εgat = (1 − ρga) log εga +
ρga log ε
ga
t−1+ηgat where ηgat is IID-Normal productivity growth rate shock. A positive
neutral productivity shock (ηat ) increases the total factor productivity on impact, after
which the effect slowly decays. This way of modeling neutral productivity shock
is standard in business cycle literature. On the other hand, the effect of a positive
productivity growth rate shock (ηgat ) on total factor productivity is small on impact;
however, it slowly builds up over time. An agent who observes a positive innovation
to εgat expects that the total factor productivity will be higher in the future. Therefore,
this specification is used to model news shock in this paper. Modeling news shocks in
this fashion is consistent with the original formulation of Beaudry and Portier (2006)
and with the findings of Barsky et al. (2014). Both studies show that news shocks have
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the character of anticipated growth shocks; in particular, they show that productivity
displays a smooth increase over a number of quarters following the news shock.
Intermediate firm chooses capital and labor to minimize their cost stream which is









Wt+i Lt+i + rkt+i K̃t+i )
]
. (16)
Combining first-order conditions of the firm gives the marginal cost function and
the labor demand function:
MCt = 1
γ t(1−α)εat
(1 − α)−(1−α)α−αrkαt W 1−αt , (17)





As in Calvo (1983), in each period, a fraction 1 − ξp of firms can set their prices.
Those who cannot set their prices index their prices to an average of the inflation of the
past period and the inflation target. Therefore, the firm maximizes his profit thinking














































is the nominal discount factor for firms which equals the discount factor









1−γp∗ for s = 1, 2, . . . ,∞.




































The aggregate price index is given by:



































The central bank follows a nominal interest rate rule by adjusting its instrument in












Y ∗t /Y ∗t−1
)rΔy
εmt (19)
where R∗ is the steady-state nominal gross interest rate, π∗t is the inflation target, and
Y ∗t is the natural output. The natural output level is defined as the output level that
would prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities and wage and price markup shocks.
The parameter rr determines the degree of interest rate smoothing. εmt is the mone-
tary policy shock which assumed to follow an AR(1) with an IID-Normal error term:
log εmt = (1 − ρm) log(εm) + ρm log εmt−1 + ηmt .
The government budget constraint is of the form
PtGt + Bt−1 = Tt + Bt
Rt
where Tt are nominal lump sum taxes that also appear in household’s budget constraint.
Government spending relative to the steady state output path, gt = Gt/(Yγ t ) is
assumed to follow the process: log gt = (1 − ρg) log g + ρg log gt−1 + ρgy(log εat −
log εat−1) + ηgt where ηgt is IID-Normal government spending shock. As in SW, the
government spending is allowed to respond to the total factor productivity process.
2.4 Market equilibrium
The final goods market is in equilibrium if production equals aggregate demand con-
sisting of households’ consumption, investment, and government expenditures.
Yt = Ct + It + Gt (20)
The capital market is in equilibrium when the demand for capital by the interme-
diate goods producers equals the supply by the households. The labor market is in
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equilibrium if firms’ demand for labor equals labor supply at the wage level set by the
households.
The interest rate is determined by the reaction function that describes monetary
policy decisions. In the bond market, equilibrium means that government debt is held
by domestic investors at the market interest rate Rt .
3 Loglinearizedmodel
As the model features a deterministic trend, it needs to be detrended in order to
make it stationary. Lower case variables represent detrended real variables which can
be considered as stationary processes that have a well-defined steady state. Then,
the resulting equations are linearized around the nonstochastic steady state for the
empirical analysis of Sect. 4. The hat (∧) above a variable denotes its log deviation
from its steady state. This section summarizes the resulting linearized equations.





ît + ĝt (21)
where cy and
i
y are the steady-state consumption–output ratio and investment–output
ratio, respectively.
The dynamics of consumption are determined by the consumption Euler equation
and is given by:
ĉt = 1
c1














for which the coefficients are given by






















































1 − h̄ ,
c4 = θ δ̄
[
σ















The dynamics of x̂t are determined by:
x̂t = ω
1 − h̄ (ĉt − h̄ĉt−1) + (1 − ω)x̂t−1. (23)
Current consumption depends positively on future and past consumption levels and
negatively on the expected real interest rate. A positive innovation to shock ε̂b means
that households require a higher interest rate to hold government bonds.
The dynamics of investment come from the investment Euler equation and are given
by:
ît = 1
1 + β̄γ ît−1 +
β̄γ
(1 + β̄γ ) Et ît+1 +
1
γ 2S′′(1 + β̄γ ) q̂t + ε̂
I
t . (24)
Current investment depends on past and future investment levels due to the invest-
ment adjustment cost and the elasticity of investmentwith respect to the price of capital
depends negatively on the investment adjustment cost parameter. ε̂ It follows an AR(1)
process with normally distributed i.i.d. errors and innovation to this shock means a
reduction in the price of capital; furthermore, it temporarily increases investment.
The real value of capital is given by:
q̂t = −(r̂t − Et π̂t+1 + ε̂bt ) + (1 − β̄(1 − τ))Et r̂ kt+1 + β̄(1 − τ)Et q̂t+1. (25)
This equation shows that the price of capital depends negatively on the real interest
rate and positively on the rental rate of capital and the future price of investment. As
ε̂bt reflects the risk premium demanded by households for holding bonds, it also shows
up in this arbitrage equation.






α(k̂t + ẑt ) + (1 − α)L̂ t + ε̂at
]
(26)





r̂ kt − q̂t
)
. (27)
The utilization rate depends positively on the rental rate of capital and negatively
on the real value of the capital.




(1 − τ) k̂t + i
k
ı̂t − rk ẑt
]
. (28)
As the variable capital utilization cost is defined in terms of capital goods, it shows
up as a negative term in this equation.
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The marginal cost is given by
m̂ct = (1 − α) ŵt + αr̂ kt − ε̂at . (29)
The pricing decision results in the following inflation equation:
π̂t = ιp
1 + βιp π̂t−1 +
β
1 + βιp Et π̂t+1
− 1
1 + βιp
(1 − βξp)(1 − ξp)
ξp
((φp − 1)εp + 1)μ̂pt . (30)
Current inflation depends on past inflation as well as on future inflation, and the
time-varying pricemarkup shock. Due to the existence of price rigidities, prices cannot
immediately adjust to desired markup levels.
Profit maximization of the intermediate good producers results in the following
labor demand equation:
ŵt = k̂t + ẑt − L̂ t + r̂ kt . (31)
The wage-setting equation is given by:
ŵt = 1
1 + β̄γ ŵt−1 +
β̄γ
1 + β̄γ Et ŵt+1 +
ιw
1 + β̄γ π̂t +
β̄γ
1 + β̄γ Et π̂t+1
+ (1 − ξ
w)(1 − β̄γ )ξw
(1 + β̄γ )ξw
1
(λw − 1)εw + 1 (ŵ
h
t − ŵt ) + ε̂wt
(32)




θ − 1 + ωκ
1 − h̄
)
L̂ t + κω
2 + (θ(1 − h̄) − κ)ω








Finally, the model is closed with the following monetary reaction function of the
central bank:
r̂t = rr r̂t−1 + (1 − rr )
[







) − (ŷt−1 − ŷ∗t−1
)] + ε̂mt . (34)
Equations (21)–(34) determine 14 endogenous variables: ŷt , ĉt , ît , l̂t , k̂t , ẑt , r̂t ,
π̂t , q̂t , ŵt , ŵht , r̂
k
t , x̂t , m̂ct of the model. The stochastic behavior of the system of
linear rational expectations equations is driven by 8 exogenous shock variables: three









markup shocks, ε̂wt , ε̂
p




t . Markup shocks follow an
ARMA(1,1) process, while all other shocks follow an AR(1) process.
4 Data and econometric methodology
This paper uses quarterly data over the period 1965Q2–2014Q3 on seven key macroe-
conomic variables for the USA, including the log difference of real GDP; real
consumption; real investment; real wages; log hours worked; inflation; and interest
rate. The dataset is assembled from various sources. Real GDP, consumption, and
investment data come from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis database. Real GDP
is measured in 1996 dollars. Data on the nominal wage and hours worked come from
the US Department of Labor database. The nominal wage is measured as nonfarm
business hourly compensation, while hours worked is calculated as the product of the
average duration of nonfarm business weekly hours and civilian employment. Infla-
tion is measured as the log difference of the GDP deflator taken from the US Bureau
of Economic Analysis database. All nominal variables are converted to real variables
using the GDP deflator. The data measuring output, real consumption, real invest-
ment, and hours worked are divided by the civilian noninstitutional population index.
Finally, the federal funds rate is taken from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. A full description of the data used is given in the Data Appendix.
The measurement equations that link the observables to the model variables are
given below:
100 ∗ dlog(GDPt ) = γ̄ + ŷt − ŷt−1
100 ∗ dlog(Ct ) = γ̄ + ĉt − ĉt−1
100 ∗ dlog(It ) = γ̄ + ît − ît−1
100 ∗ dlog(Wt ) = γ̄ + ŵt − ŵt−1
100 ∗ log(Hourst ) = l̄ + l̂t
100 ∗ dlog(GDPDeft ) = π̄ + π̂t
FFRt = r̄ + r̂t
where dlog stands for the log difference of the corresponding observable variable.
γ̄ = 100(γ −1) is the common quarterly trend growth rate to real GDP, consumption,
investment and wages; π̄ = 100(Π∗ −1) is the quarterly steady state inflation rate and
r̄ = 100( γ σc
β
Π∗ − 1) is the steady-state nominal interest rate. Finally, l̄ is the steady-
state hours worked which is normalized to be equal to zero. Lower case variables with
a hat stand for percentage deviations model variables corresponding to observables
from their steady state values.
The model presented in the previous section is estimated by using Bayesian esti-
mation techniques. All estimations are done with the Dynare program created by
Adjemian et al. (2011).
The loglinearized model developed in this paper is an extended version of Smets
and Wouters (2007). Their approach is therefore used to choose calibrated parameters
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prior to estimation. The depreciation rate is fixed at 0.025 (quarterly), the exogenous
spending-GDP ratio g/y is set at 18%, the steady-state mark-up in the labor market
(λw) is set at 1.5, and the curvature parameters of the Kimball aggregators in the goods
and the labor market (εp and εw) are both set at 10.
The priors on the stochastic processes are harmonized as much as possible. The
standard errors of the innovations are assumed to follow an inverse-gamma distribution
with a mean of 0.1 and a standard deviation of 2 and the persistence of the AR(1)
processes and MA parameters are beta distributed with a mean of 0.5 and a standard
deviation of 0.2. The Calvo probabilities are assumed to be around 0.5 for both prices
and wages with a standard error of 0.1 and the prior mean of the degree of indexation
to past inflation is also set at 0.5 with a standard error of 0.15 in both the goods and
labor markets, as in SW.
The prior on the adjustment cost parameter for investment is set at around 8 with a
standard error of 3, while the capacity utilization elasticity is set at 0.5 with a standard
error of 0.25. The mean and standard deviation of the adjustment cost parameter are
increased relative to the ones in SW, as the estimated modes of these parameters tend
to hit the boundary, with the prior used in SW. Similarly, the standard deviation of the
capacity utilization elasticity is increased from 0.15 to 0.25 to allow for the possibility
of extreme values.
There are two additional structural parameters to SW parameters due to JR prefer-
ence specification: θ and ω. θ is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of
1.4 and a standard deviation of 0.75 and, as ω is between 0 and 1, is assumed to be
beta distributed with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.25
Table 1 gives an overview of the assumptions regarding the prior distribution of the
estimated parameters.
5 Estimation results
This section discusses the results from three estimated models: (i) the generalized
model (model with generalized preference structure offered by Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2009)), (ii) the KPRmodel (the parameter for the wealth elasticity of the labor supply,
ω, is calibrated to one prior to estimation), (iii) the GHH model (the parameter for
the wealth elasticity of the labor supply, ω, is calibrated to close to zero prior to
estimation).
The results from the estimation of the generalized model suggest that with different
starting values, the optimization of the posterior density delivers two extreme param-
eter values for the parameter that governs the wealth elasticity of the labor supply, ω.
More precisely, given the initial value of this parameter, the numerical optimization
routine results in a different extreme for this parameter (either close to 0 or close to
1). This result suggests that the data prefer preferences either with a very low degree
of wealth elasticity of labor supply as in Greenwood et al. (1988) or with a strong
wealth elasticity of labor supply as in King et al. (1988). To understand whether the
likelihood surface is bimodal or flat with respect to the wealth elasticity parameter
ω, the generalized model is re-estimated when this parameter is fixed prior to the
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Table 1 Prior distributions of structural parameters and shock processes
Parameter Dist. Mean SD
σa SD of productivity shock I.Gamma 0.1 2
σga SD of productivity growth rate shock I.Gamma 0.1 2
σb SD of risk premium shock I.Gamma 0.1 2
σg SD of government spending shock I.Gamma 0.1 2
σI SD of investment shock I.Gamma 0.1 2
σm SD of monetary policy shock I.Gamma 0.1 2
σp SD of price markup shock I.Gamma 0.1 2
σw SD of wage premium shock I.Gamma 0.1 2
ρa Persistency of productivity shock Beta 0.5 0.2
ρga Persistency of productivity growth rate shock Beta 0.5 0.2
ρb Persistency of risk premium shock Beta 0.5 0.2
ρg Persistency of government spending shock Beta 0.5 0.2
ρI Persistency of investment shock Beta 0.5 0.2
ρr Persistency of monetary policy shock Beta 0.5 0.2
ρp Persistency of price markup shock Beta 0.5 0.2
ρw Persistency of wage markup shock Beta 0.5 0.2
μp MA parameter for the price markup shock Beta 0.5 0.2
μw MA parameter for the wage markup shock Beta 0.5 0.2
φ Investment adjustment cost parameter Normal 8 3
σ The coefficient of relative risk aversion Normal 1.5 0.375
h Habit formation parameter Beta 0.7 0.1
ξw Wage rigidity parameter Beta 0.5 0.1
ξp Price rigidity parameter Beta 0.5 0.1
ιw Wage indexation parameter Beta 0.5 0.15
ιp Price indexation parameter Beta 0.5 0.15
Ψ Variable capital utilization cost parameter Beta 0.5 0.25
1 + Φ/y One plus the share of fixed costs in production Normal 1.25 0.125
rπ The coefficient on inflation in monetary reaction function Normal 1.5 0.25
rr Interest rate smoothing parameter in monetary reaction function Beta 0.75 0.1
ry The coefficient on output gap in monetary reaction function Normal 0.125 0.05
rΔy The coefficient on output gap growth in monetary reaction function Normal 0.125 0.05
π Quarterly steady state inflation rate Gamma 0.625 0.1
100(β−1 − 1) Discount factor Gamma 0.25 0.1
l Steady state hours worked Normal 0.0 2.0
γ Quarterly trend growth rate Normal 0.4 0.1
ρgy The reaction of government spending to productivity shocks Normal 0.5 0.25
α Share of capital in production Normal 0.3 0.05
θ Exponent of labor in the utility function Normal 1.4 0.75
ω Wealth elasticity parameter Beta 0.5 0.25
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Fig. 1 Variation of the marginal likelihood implied by the variations of ω
estimation.3 Figure 1 shows how the likelihood varies with respect to this parameter.
This exercise confirms that the likelihood surface is bimodal for the wealth elasticity
parameter and shows why the optimization of the posterior density converges to one
of the extreme outcomes depending on the starting values.
Another observation coming from the first estimation is that two different estimates
for the wealth elasticity parameter bring about two different combinations of estimated
structural parameters and shocks processes, each with different implications for the
transmissionmechanisms and the quantitative importance of exogenous shocks.When
ω is close to 1, the productivity growth rate shocks are not chosen by the data and
the quantitative importance and the transmission mechanisms of other shocks are very
similar to SW. On the other hand, when ω is close to 0, the productivity growth rate
shocks replace the risk premium shocks in SW, and the dynamics and the quantita-
tive implications of the model change substantially. The similarity of the model with
ω = 1 extreme to SW means that the model specification is fine-tuned in favor of
this extreme. This manifests itself in the marginal likelihood difference across two
extremes. A specification search for the model with ω = 0 extreme could improve the
marginal likelihood of this extreme; however, this is left as a future exercise. Instead, to
explore the quantitative implications of these two preference structures, two additional
estimations are conducted by fixing the parameter ω to the extremes prior to estima-
3 The grid for ω is chosen as [0.001 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1].
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tion. In addition, for these estimations, irrelevant shocks are excluded for each model
specification (i.e., the risk premium shock for the GHH model and the productivity
growth rate shock for the KPR model).
Table 2 presents parameter estimates for the GHH model and the KPR model,
respectively. The posterior mode is obtained bymaximizing the log posterior function,
while the posterior mean, five and ninety-five percentiles of the posterior distribution
are obtained through the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm. The results for the GHH
model are based on two million draws (20% of the draws are kept as burn-in draws),
while the results for the KPR model are based on four hundred thousand draws (30%
of the draws are kept as burn-in draws).4
The difference between the twomodels is mainly in the labor supply conditions due
to the difference in the preference structures. For the GHH version of the model, the
magnitude of wealth effects on the labor supply is zero in the short run and, as a result,
the labor supply moves procyclically in response to most shocks. Therefore, lower
nominal rigidities or lower elasticity of investment is needed to ensure a procyclical
response of labor to demand shocks. On the other hand, the procyclical response of
labor limits the increase in wages in response to demand shocks and, hence, helps to
stabilize the marginal cost and inflation. Focusing on the parameters that are important
for explaining the persistency of wages and inflation, a number of findings are worth
emphasizing. First, the estimated degree of wage stickiness is somewhat similar across
the two models (0.78 for GHH vs 0.80 for KPR), while the estimated degree of wage
indexation for the GHH model is higher than for the KPR model (0.67 vs 0.58). On
the other hand, the estimated degree of price rigidity parameter is lower for the GHH
model compared to the KPR model (0.75 vs 0.83). Similarly, the price indexation
parameter is lower for the GHH model (0.24 vs 0.34). Second, the AR and MA
coefficients of the wage markup shock are estimated to be lower for the GHH version
(AR coefficient: 0.98 vs. 0.65 and MA coefficient: 0.96 vs. 0.62), while the estimated
standard deviation remains the same. These differences in the parameters are consistent
with the implications of different degrees of wealth elasticity on labor supply. For the
GHH preferences, lower variation in the wage variable in the model results in lower
persistency of wage markup shocks, and procyclicality of labor supply is ensured with
lower price indexation.
Turning to the monetary reaction function parameters, for the GHH specification,
the monetary policy is estimated to be less responsive to inflation (1.47 vs 1.82) and
to output gap growth (0.13 vs 0.28). This result might be explained by the lower
persistency of prices due to fallen price stickiness and persistency of wage markup
shocks. In addition, less persistentmarkup shocks result in lower volatility of the output
gap; hence, this might explain the estimated decrease in the response of monetary
policy to output and the output gap growth.
4 For each of the specifications, I run two chains of theMetropolis–Hastings algorithm. In order to assess the
convergence of the chains, univariate and multivariate diagnostics by Brooks and Gelman (1998) are used.
For both models, I find that despite different initializations, the chains converged as the number of draws
increased. For GHH model, to achieve convergence for parameters of the ARMA wage process, higher
number of draws were needed. This explains the difference in the number of draws across two models.
MCMC diagnostics as well as plots of priors and posterior distribution of parameter estimates under all
specifications are available upon request.
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Focusing on the real rigidities, there are two major differences between the two
versions of the model. First, for the GHH model, the investment adjustment cost
parameter increases substantially from 3.62 to 9.5, which implies that the elasticity
of investment with respect to the price of capital is almost tripled. This means a
gradual response of investment to all shocks and, in the case of the productivity growth
rate shock, prevents the drop in investment on impact. Second, the variable capital
utilization parameter falls from 0.9 to 0.8, which implies that elasticity of utilization
with respect to (rk − Q) increases to 0.25 from 0.11. So, for the GHH model of the
model, the utilization channel is more operative and helps to smooth the response of
the rental rate of capital and therefore the marginal cost to the shocks. In summary,
the changes in the real rigidity parameters for the GHH model help to offset the loss
of persistency of the model variables due to fallen price rigidity and the persistency
of wage markup shocks.
6 Quantitative importance of news shocks
The first condition for a shock to be a candidate to explain a significant proportion of
business cycle fluctuations is that, given themodel structure, it should be able to create a
positive correlation between output, consumption, investment, and hours present in the
data. The two variants of the model imply different transmission mechanisms for the
exogenous disturbances; therefore, for each model, a different set of shocks is elicited
to explain the sources of business cycle fluctuations. Having alternative explanations
in macroeconomics is not uncommon, as it can be seen from the famous citation from
Cochrane (1994): “What shocks are responsible for economic fluctuations? Despite
at least 200years in which economists observed fluctuations in economic activity, we
are still not sure.” Therefore, I aim to offer two complementary explanations based
on the two different model specifications that I estimate. I do not aim to propose one
single model that explains the variations in the economy. To assess the quantitative
importance of shocks considered for each model, I present unconditional (average)
forecast error variance decompositions in Table 3.5
For the GHH model, three productivity shocks: Neutral productivity shock, pro-
ductivity growth rate shock, and investment shock explain most of the short-run and
long-run variations in the real variables. The short-run movements in real GDP and
consumption are primarily driven by technology shocks, productivity growth rate
shocks, investment shocks, and productivity shocks. Together, they account for 81%
and 84% of the unconditional forecast error variance of real GDP growth and con-
sumption growth, respectively. In the long run, the same set of shocks explain most
of the variance in output and consumption level. However, the share of productiv-
ity growth rate shocks and productivity shocks rises, while the share of investment
shocks drops. Other shocks play only small roles in accounting for both the short-run
and the long-run variance in output and consumption. Investment shocks dominate
all other shocks with a share of 87% in accounting for the unconditional variation of
5 The conditional forecast error variance decompositions for forecast horizons 12, 24, 36 and 48 are
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investment growth. In the long run, productivity and productivity growth rate shocks
become dominant with 32% and 31% share in variation in investment level, respec-
tively. Finally, the GHHmodel attributes most of the variation in hours to productivity
shocks and productivity growth rate shocks.
For the KPR model, fluctuations in output growth are mainly due to risk premium
shocks (30%), productivity shocks (22%), and, to a lesser extent, government spending
shocks (19%). On the other hand, productivity shocks (50%), risk premium shocks
(12%), and wage markup shocks (16%) are dominant reasons for the variations in
the level of output. Risk premium shocks are important for the short-run variation in
consumption (50%), while productivity shocks (43%) andwagemarkup shocks (27%)
become dominant for the long-run variation in this variable.
Investment is mainly driven by investment-specific technology shocks both in the
short run and in the long run (67% and 46%, respectively). Finally, wage markup
shocks (33%) and risk premium shocks (25%) are dominant drivers for the variation
of hours in the KPR model. These results are in line with that of SW.
Similar to the GHH specification, Justiniano et al. (2010) attribute a large share
of output fluctuations to investment shocks both in the short run and in the long run.
On the other hand, similar to the KPR version, they find a small role for these shocks
in accounting for variations in consumption and they rely on productivity shocks
and preference shocks to explain the variation in consumption.6 This difference in
explaining variations in consumption is due to the modifications in the transmission
mechanisms of the models. For the GHH specification, consumption responds pro-
cyclically to investment shocks, whereas in the KPR specification and Justiniano et al.
(2010), its response is negative. Similarly, Khan and Tsoukalas (2011) show that cre-
ating a model featuring the procyclical response of consumption to investment shocks
increase the quantitative importance of investment shocks in accounting for variations
in real variables. Justiniano et al. (2010) explain the difference of their results relative
to SW regarding the quantitative importance of investment shocks by the fact that they
use different definitions of investment and consumption in their estimation.7 On the
contrary, this paper uses the dataset of SW and in the GHH model, investment shocks
are found to be very important in explaining fluctuations in output, consumption, and
investment due to convenient internal propagation mechanisms existing in the model
for investment shocks.
For the GHH model, although productivity growth rate shocks are important for
output and consumption fluctuations, its share is negligible for the short-run variation
in investment. This is due to theweak short-run response of investment to those shocks.
The emergence of productivity growth rate shocks as one of the major determinants
of output and consumption fluctuations for the GHH model relies, in part, on the
identification of investment shocks as the most quantitatively important shock. In the
KPR model (also in SW), the risk premium shock helps to explain the co-movement
6 Preference shock is defined as a shock to discount factor as in Smets and Wouters (2003) which affects
only the inter-temporal consumption Euler equation. In the KPR model, instead of discount factor shock,
risk premium shock is utilized to generate co-movement among consumption and investment.
7 In SW, inventory changes are not included in investment; however, they are included in output. Durable
consumption is included in consumption. Justiniano et al. (2010) include both of these into investment;
hence, the investment series used by them is more pro-cyclical and volatile.
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of consumption and investment. In the GHH version, this co-movement is generated
by investment shock; hence, productivity growth rate shock is identified to account
for the remaining variation in output, consumption, and hours.
7 Understanding the great recession
There is a recent discussion in the literature that seeks to understand if productivity
slowdown contributed to the crisis. Christiano et al. (2015) estimate a DSGE model
using pre-2008 data and then use the estimated model to run simulations to analyze
Great Recession period. For their simulations, they adopt an unobserved components
representation for the growth rate of neutral technology. To be more explicit, in their
model, when there is a shock to productivity, agents do not know whether it is transi-
tory or permanent and they solve a signal extraction problem when they adjust their
forecast of future values of productivity in response to an unanticipated move in cur-
rent productivity. Using this setup, they suggest that the TFP was persistently low
during the Great Recession and the slowdown in productivity contributed to the drop
in consumption, investment, and output while creating positive effects on employ-
ment and labor force participation. Similarly, Gust et al. (2017) show that the TFP
was low during the beginning of the recession and that it only recovered in 2010. On
the contrary, Lindé et al. (2016) re-estimate SW using pre-recession and recession
data, and they show that their estimation procedure filters out a sequence of positive
technology shocks during the recession. They also claim that weak TFP growth was
not a key driver of the crisis. Contributing to this line of research, this section aims to
understand the roles of productivity and expectations about future productivity in the
emergence and deepening of the Great Recession.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics, FRED Economic Data (Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis), and OECD publish annual measurements of productivity for the USA. In
addition, Fernald (2012) propose a quarterly measurement for raw and utilization-
adjusted total factor productivity for the business sector. I present different measures
in three different diagrams. First, Fig. 2 presents the percentage growth rate of the
annual multi-factor and labor productivity series for both the private business and
manufacturing sectors, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics between the years
1987 and 2014. Second, the upper panel of Fig. 3 presents the annual percentage
growth rate of the total factor productivity between the years 1964 and 2011, pub-
lished by the FRED Economic Database, while the lower panel presents the annual
percentage growth rate of multi-factor and labor productivity measures of the OECD
productivity database. Finally, Fig. 4 shows the annualized quarterly growth rate of raw
and utilization-adjusted total factor productivity for the business sector for 1965Q2–
2014Q3, proposed by Fernald (2012). Two common patterns are worth highlighting in
all of these four measurements of productivity. First, there was an upsurge in produc-
tivity growth in the late nineties; subsequently, the productivity slowdown began prior
to the 2001 recession. Second, a similar acceleration of the productivity growth and
following slowdown occurred prior to the Great Recession. In particular, the produc-
tivity growth started to decline as early as 2003, years before the start of the recession.
Fernald (2014) shows that the mid-1990s surge in the productivity growth ended prior
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Fig. 2 Bureau of Labor Statistics measures of multi-factor productivity and labor productivity (% growth).
Shaded regions indicate recessions dated by NBER
to the Great Recession; however, as of 2003Q4, growth returned to its 1973–1995
pace. Complementary evidence is given by Kahn and Rich (2007), showing that by
early 2005, the probability reached near unity that the economy was in a low-growth
regime.
Therefore, when we look at this episode through the lens of today, we see that
productivity was already low prior to the recession and it appears that it was not the
unexpected slowdown of productivity that caused the crisis. However, there is a prob-
lem with the productivity data in that, typically, these data are only available with a
considerable delay. Hence, economic agents cannot observe real-time data on produc-
tivity when making their decisions and, instead, try to forecast future fundamentals
given the (imperfect) signals they receive. From this perspective, a wave of optimism
might create an investment and consumption demand today which then turns into a
crash if beliefs turn out to be overoptimistic. In what comes next, I explore this idea as
a potential contributor to the Great Recession. Section 7.1 presents two narratives that
suggest that economic agents were over-optimistic regarding the future path of pro-
ductivity prior to the recession. Section 7.2 shows the implications of the two model
specifications for the causes of the Great Recession.
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Fig. 3 OECD and FRED Economic Data measures of multi-factor productivity and labor productivity (%
growth). Shaded regions indicate recessions dated by NBER
7.1 Bad prospects but optimistic expectations
This section presents the estimated time series for productivity levels for all model
specifications8 and compares them to the other estimates in the literature. Figure 5
shows that the estimated productivity series for the GHH model displays similar pat-
terns relative to the one for the KPR model. The discrepancy in the level is due to
the presence of growth rate shock in the productivity process for the GHH model. It
can be seen in the first panel in Fig. 5 that the estimated series for all specifications
can replicate some well-established historical patterns, such as the productivity slow-
down in the 1970s and the productivity surge in the late 1990s. This is consistent with
the findings of Fernald (2014) and Kahn and Rich (2007)(with its updated reports),
in which productivity starts to slow down around 2005, taking off again toward the
end of the recession. The second panel in Fig. 5 shows the smoothed series for the
productivity growth rate shock. The positive (negative) values can be interpreted as
periods in which agents are optimistic (pessimistic) about future productivity.9 It can
8 The estimate is the smoothed series derived with simple Kalman filter.
9 Here, optimistic/pessimistic expectations do not refer to subjective feelings about future productivity.
Instead, estimated growth rate shocks are realized shocks and agents’ expectations about future productivity
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Fig. 4 Fernald’s measures of total factor productivity and utilization adjusted total factor productivity
(annualized % growth). Shaded regions indicate recessions dated by NBER
be seen that the productivity growth rate series show a continuous increase prior to
the recession despite the drop in productivity level and it continues to rise until the
middle of the recession. This shows that despite the slowdown in productivity, agents
expected higher growth between 2005 and 2009 and did not recognize deteriorating
productivity trends on time. In what follows, I present two narratives consistent with
this conjecture.
The first narrative comes from estimates of the potential output of the Congressional
Budget Office. One of their reports, published in 2014, examines how their estimate of
potential output for 2017 changed between January 2007 and February 2014.10 In the
report, it is documented that from the earlier projection to the later one, the Congres-
sional Budget Office reduced its projection for 2017 by 7.3% and it is suggested that
about two-thirds of this revision is due to a reassessment of economic trends that were
in process before the recession began. In the report, it is stated that after the National
are rational given the information available to them. However, since a positive shock to the growth rate of
productivity means an expectation of a gradual and continuous increase in future productivity, whichmay or
may not be confirmed later on, I interpret these shocks as optimistic expectations about future productivity.
(Opposite is true for negative shocks.)
10 The report is called “Revisions to CBO’s Projection of Potential Output Since 2007” and can be accessed
through the following URL: https://www.cbo.gov/publication/45150.
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Fig. 5 Estimated productivity and productivity growth rate series. Shaded regions indicate recessions dated
by NBER
Bureau of Economic Research designated the fourth quarter of 2007 as the peak of
the business cycle, the agency concluded that the trend rates of growth in the 2000s
had generally been lower than they were in the 1990s. In addition, they estimated new
trends between business cycle peaks in 2001 and 2007.
The second narrative comes from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, which
is a survey of macroeconomic forecasts for the US economy issued by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Figure 6 presents the first quarter average and median
forecasts for the annual average rate of growth in productivity over the current and next
9years in percentage points. It can be seen that both the mean and median forecasts in
2000s are above 2% and the mean forecast starts to decline by 2005, while the median
forecast starts to decline by 2007. However, the substantial revision of expectations
starts in the first quarter of 2007, just before the outbreak of the crisis.
Based on these narratives, wemight conclude that there was some evidence of over-
optimistic expectations about future fundamentals prior to the recession. However, to
what extent did the revisions in the expectations contribute to the emergence and
deepening of the crisis? The next section attempts to answer this question.
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Fig. 6 Mean and median forecasts of Survey of Professional Forecasters for 10-year productivity growth
7.2 Which shocks caused the Great Recession?
In Sect. 6, I showed how the quantitative importance of shocks considered in this paper
differs across two model specifications; GHH and KPR. In this section, I use these
variants of the model to interpret the Great Recession period.
Figure 7 presents the historical decomposition of output, consumption, investment,
and hours worked for the KPR model. It can be seen that the early phase of the
recession ismainly explained bynegative risk premiumshocks and investment-specific
technology shocks. As the Federal Reserve cuts the Fed Funds Rate to near zero by the
end of 2008, the negative effect of the zero lower bound starts to kick in by 2009Q1,
which is the worst quarter during the recession period. In addition, the largest impact
of the negative risk premium shock occurs during this quarter. 2009Q2 is designated as
the trough of the recession period by theNational Bureau of Economic Research. As of
this date, risk premium shocks start to contribute positively to output and consumption
growth, whereas investment shock and monetary policy shock continue to affect the
economy negatively. During the recession period and the recovery, productivity shocks
contribute positively to the economy except for small declines in 2008Q2 and 2009Q1.
To sum up, the KPR model interprets this period as a series of negative risk premium
shocks together with a series of negative investment-specific technology shocks. Both
shocks can be regarded as proxies to the financialmarket disturbances. The investment-
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Fig. 7 Historical decomposition for the KPR Model
specific technology shock affects the production of installed capital from investment
goods and can be considered as a proxy to the disturbances to the intermediation
ability of the financial sector. Justiniano et al. (2011) show that these shocks correlate
strongly with interest rate spreads. On the other hand, risk premium shocks can be
regarded as a proxy for net worth shocks, as suggested by SW or as a proxy for shocks
to the demand for safe assets as in Fisher (2015). Therefore, one can say that the KPR
model points to financial market disruptions as the main driver of the recession.
As mentioned in previous sections, with the GHH version of the model, data filter
out productivity growth rate shocks instead of risk premium shocks. Figure 8 presents
historical decompositions for this model. It can be seen that productivity growth rate
shocks remain positive until the most acute phase of the recession, only creating
a large negative effect on output and consumption growth in 2009Q1. The date of
the negative shift of expectations coincides with the fall of Lehman Brothers, which
occurred in September 2008.11 Similar to the KPR model, during the early phase of
the recession, investment shocks are the dominant factor that lead to the fall in output
and consumption, and the zero lower bound starts to be active as of 2009Q2. It can
11 The evolution of smoothed innovations for the two versions of the model is presented in the online
appendix.
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Fig. 8 Historical decomposition for the GHH Model
be seen that after this date, productivity shocks and productivity growth rate shocks
contribute positively to the output and consumption growth.
Before the fall of Lehman Brothers, there was widespread optimism regarding
the future growth of the economy. Economic agents were forecasting very strong
figures for both productivity and output growth and these expectations caused the
expected income to rise. As a result, households increased their demand for goods
and services. Specifically, high demand increased house prices in the economy and
reinforced wealth effects on homeowners, inducing them to further increase their
consumption.With the fall ofLehmanBrothers, the growth expectations underlying the
boom temporarily crashed and households significantly decreased their consumption
due to the falling growth prospects for that quarter. However, the negative effect of
pessimistic expectations did not persist, as the monetary policy managed to affect the
growth expectations positively with alternative expansionary monetary policy tools
starting from 2009Q2. Moreover, the positive trend in productivity growth contributed
to the formation of optimistic expectations about the future starting from the middle
of the recession. Finally, output and consumption growth remained weak after the
recession, for both models, due to enduring financial system problems manifesting
themselves as investment-specific technology shocks.
These results suggest the data are quite informative and both models attribute most
of the role to investment shocks and monetary policy shocks for the big drop of
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the output and consumption during the recession and their slow recovery afterward.
However, the two models interpret the quarter after the fall of Lehman Brothers (the
most acute quarter of the recession) quite differently: For this quarter, according to
the GHHmodel, a decline in growth expectations contributed significantly to negative
growth while risk premium shocks were in effect according to the KPRmodel. Finally,
for both versions of the model, productivity followed an increasing path and weak
productivity growth was not responsible for the emergence and the persistence of the
crisis. On the contrary, they contributed positively to the recovery.
8 Conclusion
The idea of expectation-driven business cycles is worth analyzing because it is an
intuitive and plausible explanation for economic fluctuations and it offers a plausible
theory for recessions for the class of technology-driven business cycle models. For
instance, the economy might enter a bust period, even in periods of technological
growth, if the growth in TFP is less than expected. In this paper, I aimed to assess
the quantitative importance of news shocks in the presence of other shocks that are
commonly used in the literature. To this end, I modified the (Smets andWouters 2007)
model with the preference structure offered in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). In addi-
tion, to specify news shock, I considered productivity growth rate shocks instead of
jump specification, which is commonly used in the literature. This way of model-
ing news shock has two advantages. First, the data decide on the trajectory of TFP
following an i.i.d. shock to the productivity growth rate, and there is no need to set
an arbitrary date for the realization of the shock. Second, for all possible trajectories
of TFP, this specification implies a smooth and continuous change in TFP and other
variables. This is a desired property for the fit of the model considering the persistency
of macroeconomic variables.
The maximization of the posterior density of the generalized model shows that the
parameter that governs the wealth elasticity of the labor supply is not identified by the
data: The data prefer preferences either with a very low degree of wealth elasticity of
the labor supply, as in Greenwood et al. (1988), or with a strong wealth elasticity of the
labor supply, as in King et al. (1988). Moreover, for the two preference specifications,
the quantitative implications of the estimated model change substantially. For the
model with King et al. (1988) preferences (the KPR model), risk premium, wage
markup shocks and productivity shocks are quantitatively important. On the other
hand, for the model with Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences (the GHHmodel), three
productivity shocks explain most of the variation in real variables. In particular, for
the GHH model, news shocks replace risk premium shocks in the KPR model and
they are identified as an important driver of business cycle fluctuations.
To obtain the posterior distribution of parameters, using the Metropolis–Hastings
algorithm, I run two additional estimations by fixing the wealth elasticity parameter to
close to zero and to one prior to estimation. Two results emerge from these estimations:
(i) I find that the parameter estimates and quantitative importance of the shocks are
very similar to their counterparts from the posterior density maximization; (ii) among
the two models considered, the KPR model outperforms the GHH model in terms
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of likelihood. The second result seems to favor strong wealth effects on the labor
supply. However, the difference in likelihoods is not surprising, as the KPR model is
very similar to SW and the model specification is fine-tuned in favor of this model.
Considering that the existence of wealth effects on the labor supply is still an open
question in the literature, I use both versions of the model to offer two complementary
explanations for the US business cycles.
Modifying the model to achieve a better fit for the GHH version might improve
the likelihood of this version. For example, the substitution of the risk premium shock
in the KPR model with the productivity growth rate shock in the GHH model is
consistent with empirical findings in the literature regarding the information content of
interest rate spreads. Pessimistic expectations about future productivity are frequently
associated with expanding credit spreads and it is difficult to differentiate between
risk premium shocks and expectation shocks. Therefore, extending the current model
with the financial accelerator mechanism to allow for the endogenous determination
of credit spreads seems to be a promising path in order to explain the relationship
between risk premium and growth rate shocks and to improve the fit of the model.
Finally, in addition to providing a general explanation for business cycles, I use the
two versions of the model to analyze the Great Recession period. I find that although
the two models offer very different explanations to business cycles, they interpret the
Great Recession period rather similarly, except for the worst quarter of the crisis. The
GHH model attributes the deepening of the crisis to the collapse of over-optimistic
expectations while the KPR model attributes most of the role to worsening credit
conditions. For both model specifications, general developments in productivity are
estimated to be positive. Therefore, productivity slowdown is not among the reasons
for the emergence or persistence of the Great Recession. Using the GHH model,
I show that the productivity trends started to slow down prior to the recession, as
early as the year 2005; however, agents continued to expect stronger growth until
the middle of the recession period. In addition, the collapse of these over-optimistic
expectations contributed to the deepening of the recession in 2009Q1. In real life,
the data for productivity are available with a delay and agents forecast the future
fundamentals using these weak signals. Therefore, extending the current model to
allow for a learning mechanism might be a promising way to understand how waves
of optimism and pessimism affect the real economy.
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